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  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 14-4367 
_________________ 
 
PETER QUINN, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TAMIKA CINTRON, PHILADELPHIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; 
DETECTIVE RUSSELL SHOEMAKER, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
CENTRAL DETECTIVE DIVISON; OFFICER MICHAEL RAFFERTY, 
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, 9TH POLICE DISTRICT; CITY OF 
PHILADELPHIA, PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 
_________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-02471) 
District Judge:  Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr. 
_________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 5, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SMITH, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed November 10, 2015) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
 Peter Quinn appeals the District Court’s order granting defendants Russell 
Shoemaker and Michael Rafferty’s motion for partial summary judgment and its order 
denying reconsideration.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
I. 
 On December 1, 2009, Quinn appeared as a court-appointed attorney in family 
court in Philadelphia.  Tamika Cintron, a Philadelphia Department of Human Services 
(“DHS”) social worker, was assigned to one of Quinn’s cases.  In the waiting room, 
Quinn went to move Cintron’s jacket to sit in the vacant seat next to her.  Cintron became 
upset and accused Quinn of elbowing her.  Three other DHS employees witnessed the 
altercation.  
 The police were called and Detective Shoemaker arrived at the courthouse. 
Detective Shoemaker spoke with Cintron, who stated that she had been elbowed, 
indicated that her rib cage hurt, and identified Quinn as her assailant.  Detective 
Shoemaker also spoke with the three eyewitnesses, all of whom corroborated Cintron’s 
account.  Officer Rafferty then arrived at the courthouse and was directed by Detective 
Shoemaker to handcuff Quinn and transport him to police headquarters.  Cintron and the 
three eyewitnesses were also brought to police headquarters to be interviewed further.   
Quinn was charged with aggravated assault, simple assault, and recklessly 
endangering another person, but the charges were eventually dropped.  Subsequently, 
Quinn sued Detective Shoemaker and Officer Rafferty (hereinafter, “the officers”) for, 
among other things, false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
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and Pennsylvania state law.  The officers moved for partial summary judgment on these 
claims, arguing that they had probable cause to arrest Quinn.  The District Court agreed 
and granted the motion.  Quinn’s remaining excessive force claim against Officer 
Rafferty went to trial and the jury found in Officer Rafferty’s favor.  This appeal 
followed.1   
II. 
Quinn argues that a dispute of material fact exists as to whether the officers had 
probable cause to arrest him at the courthouse.  He highlights Detective Shoemaker’s 
conflicting testimony regarding when he thought he had probable cause to arrest Quinn, 
at the courthouse versus at the police station.  But Detective Shoemaker’s subjective 
understanding does not change the objective analysis required under the probable cause 
inquiry.  As the District Court pointed out, any dispute as to when Quinn was actually 
arrested is ultimately irrelevant; under the circumstances here, viewed objectively, the 
officers had probable cause to arrest Quinn at the courthouse. 
We note that, generally, “the question of probable cause in a section 1983 damage 
suit is one for the jury.”2  A court, however, “may conclude ‘that probable cause exists as 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court's grant of 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard the district court applied.  Doe v. 
Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
2 Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998).   
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a matter of law if the evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not 
support a contrary factual finding,’ and may enter summary judgment accordingly.”3   
“The test for an arrest without probable cause is an objective one, based on ‘the 
facts available to the officers at the moment of arrest.’”4  “[P]robable cause to arrest 
exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been 
or is being committed by the person to be arrested.”5  An officer’s state of mind “does not 
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that 
action.”6  We will therefore examine the facts and circumstances that were gathered by 
the officers at the courthouse to determine whether Quinn’s arrest was supported by 
probable cause. 
At the courthouse, Cintron told Detective Shoemaker that she had been elbowed 
and identified Quinn as her assailant.  We have held that “[w]hen a police officer has 
received a reliable identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have 
probable cause.”7  Even if Cintron’s account alone was insufficient, Detective Shoemaker 
also received information from three eyewitnesses at the courthouse.  The Supreme Court 
has explained that “in making a warrantless arrest an officer may rely upon information 
received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the 
                                              
3 Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788-89 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
4 Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).   
5 Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).   
6 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
7 Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 791 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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informant’s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s 
knowledge.”8  Here, we have not just an informant but three eyewitnesses, all of whom 
corroborated Cintron’s account of the incident.  Based on these facts and circumstances, 
we conclude that the officers had probable cause to arrest Quinn at the courthouse. 
Quinn also argues that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him because 
there was no evidence that Cintron endured any bodily injury.  This argument confuses 
the probable cause inquiry with the prosecutor’s burden of proof at trial, that is, to prove 
every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.9  Indeed, the three cases Quinn 
cites in support of this argument all involve whether there was sufficient evidence to 
maintain an assault conviction.  Thus, Quinn’s emphasis on the fact that the crime of 
assault under Pennsylvania law requires “bodily injury” is to no avail.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court did not err in granting 
the officers’ motion for partial summary judgment and in denying reconsideration.  We 
will therefore affirm.  
                                              
8 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 242 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
9 See Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 482-83 (“[P]robable cause to arrest requires more than mere 
suspicion; however, it does not require that the officer have evidence sufficient to prove 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
